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The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. v. United 
International Holdings, Inc.: The 
Supreme Court Breaks Old Ground 
Mark J. Loewenstein * 
This article analyzes the Supreme Court's decision to decide 
only one federal securities law case, The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. 
v. United International Holdings, Inc. On the face of it, the Court 
simply affirmed long-standing, uncontroversial tenets of Rule 
1 Ob-5. However, the article provides different explanations to 
the Court's decision. 
Introduction 
In its 2000-01 Term, the United States Supreme Court decided 
one federal securities law case, The Whaif (Holdings) Ltd. v. United 
International Holdings, Inc. 1 The fact that the Court took only one 
securities law case is unremarkable. Its decision to take this case, 
however, and the outcome it reached are somewhat remarkable. 
This is not because the Court altered existing law or resolved a 
conflict among the circuits, but rather just the opposite: the Court 
took an uncontroversial case that raised no novel issues, and 
unanimously affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit."2 One might then reasonably inquire as to why the 
Court granted certiorari in this case. I will return to that question in 
the conclusion to this article. 
Wharf involved an oral option contract between plaintiff and de-
fendant, pursuant to which defendant orally agreed to sell to plaintiff 
10% of the stock of a new cable system in Hong Kong that defen-
dant was developing, in consideration for consulting services that 
*Mark J. Loewenstein is a Professor of Law, University of Colorado School 
of Law, Boulder, Colorado. 
1121 S.Ct. 1776 (2001). 
"
2The Tenth Circuit decision is reported at 210 F.2d 1207 (lOth Cir. 2000). 
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plaintiff was providing for the cable system."3 Although plaintiff 
sought to exercise the option, defendant refused to accept plaintiff's 
payment or issue the stock.4 Plaintiff brought suit under Rule 10b-5 
(and various state law claims), alleging that defendant fraudulently 
misrepresented that plaintiff could acquire stock pursuant to the op-
tion. In fa9t, plaintiff alleged, defendant never intended to honor the 
option contract. As the option contract constituted a contract to sell 
a security, the Court held that defendant's misrepresentations were 
made in connection with the sale of a security and thus actionable 
under Rule 10b-5. 
The plaintiff prevailed in a trial before a jury, which awarded it 
$67 million in compensatory damages and $58.5 million in punitive 
damages on the state-law claims. The Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed.5 There were two is-
sues before Court: first, whether an oral agreement can be the basis 
for a claim under Rule 1 Ob-5; and second, whether an undisclosed 
reservation not to permit the exercise of an option falls outside of 
§ 1 O(b) (and, hence, Rule 1 Ob-5) because the misrepresentation 
does not relate to the value of the security and therefore does not 
implicate § 1 O(b)' s policy of full disclosure. 
The Issues in Wharf 
Oral Contract Within Antifraud Provisions 
The Court was little troubled by either issue. On the argument 
that an oral agreement is outside the purview of a Rule 10b-5 claim, 
the Court found nothing in the securities acts or its own precedents 
to support the defendant's position. The Court noted that oral 
contracts for the sale of securities are ''sufficiently common that the 
Uniform Commercial Code and statutes of fraud in every State now 
consider them enforceable.' ' 6 The Court also noted that excepting 
oral contracts from the coverage of the Securities and Exchange Act 
"
3 121 S.Ct. at 1779. 
4Id. 
5Id. at 1780. 
6Id. at 1781, citing U.C.C. § 8-113 (Supp. 2000). 
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of 1934 "would significantly limit the Act's coverage, thereby 
undermining its basic purposes.' ' 7 
Rule 10b-5 Covers Misrepresentations Regarding 
Intentions 
On defendant's second argument- that Rule 10b-5 did not 
forbid misrepresentations regarding defendant's intentions- the 
Court decided that this sort of misrepresentation is actionable. De-
fendant was essentially claiming that its misrepresentation did not 
go to the value of the security and that disputes over the ownership 
of securities are not actionable under Rule 1 Ob-5. The Court 
responded that a misrepresentation relating to defendant's inten-
tions did affect the value: "[s]ince [defendant] did not intend to 
honor the option, the option was, unbeknownst to [plaintifl:], value-
less.''8 Thus, this dispute was over more than mere ownership.9 
Several observations about this case center on this second argu-
ment. First, although not critical to the outcome of the case, the 
Court's last-quoted statement was obviously incorrect. Even if the 
defendant did not intend to honor the option, the option still had 
value. Plaintiff may not have paid as much, knowing it might have 
to litigate to perfect its rights, but surely the contract right it acquired 
was not valueless. A cynic might say, noting the considerable dam-
ages that plaintiff recovered, that plaintiff underpaid for its option. 
Deception Within Antifraud Rule 
Second, the case did not really involve an active misrepresenta-
tion. Rather, the defendant had a "secret reservation" (that it would 
not honor its contractual commitment), which the Court simply 
characterized as a misrepresentation. The Court supported this 
characterization with a citation to a comment to § 530 of theRe-
statement (Second) of Torts that indicates that a promise made 
without an intention to perform is ''fraudulent.' ' 10 By relying on the 
Restatement of Torts, the Court avoided analysis under its estab-
lished Rule 1 Ob-5 jurisprudence. Traditionally, the failure to dis-
close (in this case that the defendant did not intend to honor the 
7 Id. 
8Id. at 1782. 
9Id. 
10ld. 
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agreement) is only fraudulent if there is a duty to disclose. In 
Chiarella v. United States/1 the Court held that an employee of a 
printer had no duty to the sellers of stock to disclose the nonpublic 
information that he had acquired through his employment and, 
therefore, his failure to disclose (or to refrain from trading) could 
not constitute a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance 
under § 1 O(b ). Similarly, in Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, 12 the Court held that a financial analyst who passed along to 
his clients nonpublic information about a company that he received 
from an officer of the company did not violate § 1 O(b) or Rule 
1 Ob-5, because the officer who disclosed the information to the 
analyst did not breach any fiduciary duty to the company in making 
the disclosure and, therefore, the analyst could not have a breached 
a fiduciary duty. 
Applying Chiarella and Dirks to the facts of Wharf suggests that 
the defendant in Wharfviolated Rule 10b-5 only if it had a duty to 
disclose its intention not to honor its contractual commitment. In 
fact, it had no such duty. The source of this duty could not be a fidu-
ciary duty, as parties contracting with one another at arm's length 
(as were these parties) generally do not owe fiduciary duties to one 
another, nor could the duty arise under general notions of good faith 
and fair dealing, as this duty generally arises only after the parties 
have contracted. Thus, defendant's liability for securities fraud turns 
not on a failure to disclose or an active misrepresentation, but rather 
on the notion that defendant's conduct falls within the tort of deceit 
and, therefore, violates Rule 10b-5.13 
This conclusion is not remarkable and is consistent with United 
States v. 0 'Hagan, 14 the Court's most recent pronouncement on 
Rule 10b-5. In O'Hagan, the Court upheld the defendant's securi-
ties fraud conviction even though the ''defrauded'' party was not 
the seller of the securities, but defendant's client. Defendant was a 
lawyer whose firm represented the bidder in a hostile takeover. In 
advance of the bid, defendant purchased securities in the target 
11 445 u.s. 222 (1980). 
12463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
13That Rule 1 Ob-5 covers conduct other than misrepresentations seems un-
controversial. United States v. 0 'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), discussed in 
the text, did not involve a misrepresentation or a failure to disclose. Similarly, 
cases such as Costello v. Oppenheimer & Co., 711 F.2d 1361 (7th Cir. 1983), 
involving a claim of churning by a broker, do not involve misrepresentations. 
14521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
[VOL. 29: 255 2001] WHARF HOLDINGS 259 
company. Because defendant was not an insider of the target, he 
owed no fiduciary duty to the target company or its shareholders. As 
a partner in the law firm that represented the bidder, however, de-
fendant did owe a fiduciary duty to the bidder not to misappropriate 
the confidential information that had been entrusted to him. His mis-
appropriation, the Court concluded, was a fraud on his client, which 
fraud was ''in connection with'' his purchase of securities and thus 
a violation of Rule 10b-5. 
"In Connection Requirement" Not Expressly 
Considered 
This raises a final aspect of Wharf· the Court avoided a potentially 
troubling ''in connection with'' issue when it decided that the ''mis-
representation" did go to the value of the security. In O'Hagan, the 
Court found that defendant's fraud on his client was connected 
closely enough with his securities transactions to be ''in connection 
with'' those transactions. In Wharf, the Court might have considered 
whether plaintiff would still have a claim if defendant's misrepre-
sentation was clearly collateral to the value of the security, as argu-
ably it was. If, for instance, defendant had represented (falsely) to 
plaintiff that plaintiff's stock acquisition would enhance plaintiff's 
reputation in the cable industry and on the basis of that misrepresen-
tation plaintiff purchased the option, would plaintiff be able to bring 
a claim under Rule 10b-5?15 
The ''in connection with'' requirement of Rule 1 Ob-5 is one of 
the murkier areas of the Rule's jurisprudence.16 The Court's 1971 
decision in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty 
Co., 17 and its more recent decision in 0 'Hagan, give a liberal read-
ing to the ''in connection with'' requirement, insisting only that the 
fraud "touch" upon the sale of securities for the Rule to be ap-
plicable. More to the point, lower court cases have rejected the no-
15Even this representation arguably goes to value, as plaintiff might claim 
that a security that enhances its reputation is more valuable to it than one that 
does not. 
16See, e.g., James D. Cox, Robert W. Hillman and Donald C. Langevoort, 
SECURITIES REGULATION at 710 (3d ed. 2001)("Unfortunately, the 'in 
connection with' standard is little understood, and a close look at the cases 
that have invoked it shows no consistent judicial treatment or prevailing 
interpretive principle.'') 
17404 U.S. 6 (1971). 
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tion that the misrepresentation must go to the value of the security.18 
In any case, the Court seems to have intentionally avoided revisiting 
the "in connection with" question in this case. By avoiding this is-
sue, and relying on the tort of deceit, the Court's decision in Wharf 
is simply that an intentional misrepresentation by a seller of a secu-
rity that relates to the value of the security being sold violates Rule 
10b-5. This is hardly a controversial conclusion and is indeed ''old 
ground.'' 
Conclusion 
Inasmuch as the Court simply affirmed long-standing, uncontro-
versial tenets of Rule 1 Ob-5, why did it take the case? One might 
speculate that it took the case because defendant's misrepresenta-
tion did seem collateral to the value of the security and thus did 
raise an "in connection with" issue worth considering, especially if 
the Court was looking to restrict the reach of Rule 1 Ob-5. Then, one 
might speculate, the justices became convinced, as Justice Breyer 
stated in the opinion, that the misrepresentation did affect the value 
of the security, thus mooting the issue. So what seemed like a case 
with a meaty issue turned into one with no issue at all. 
A second possible explanation - and one directly contrary to the 
first - is that the Court is signaling a renewed respect for Rule 
10b-5. In a series of decisions, starting with Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores19 in 197 5 and culminating with Central Bank of 
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver20 in 1994, the Court 
systematically and consciously trimmed back the scope of Rule 
10b-5, but may now be reversing that trend. O'Hagan, and now 
Wharf, both represented opportunities to further limit the scope of 
the Rule. Wharf seemed like a good vehicle to do that, especially 
because the case seemed more like a state claim for breach of 
18E.g., SEC v. Jakubowski, 150 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1998)(lawyer committed 
securities fraud by misrepresenting the identity of the purchaser of the securi-
ties); Threadgill v. Black, 730 F.2d 810, 811-12 (D.C. Cir. 1984)("fraud in 
the purchase or sale includes 'entering into a contract of sale with the secret 
reservation not to fully perform. '")(citing Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 
F.2d 393, 396 (9th Cir. 1973)); A.T Brad & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 
(2d Cir. 1967)(customer's misrepresentation that he would pay for stock when 
his intention was to pay only if it increased in value violated§ 10(b)). 
19421 u.s. 723 (1975). 
20511 U.S. 164 (1994) 
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contract than a federal securities fraud case. So characterized, the 
case seemed to fit within the Court's philosophy that the federal 
courts ought not to recognize an implied cause of action under 
federal statutes when there is an adequate state law remedy.21 By not 
taking that stance, it is clear that Rule lOb-5 remains an important 
antifraud claim, not to be displaced by state law remedies. 
As between these competing explanations of the Wharf case, the 
first seems to be the more plausible. It seems unlikely, as the second 
rationale requires, that the Court would consciously engage in 
signaling in this area. What purpose would it serve - to encourage 
skittish plaintiffs to file securities fraud claims? Moreover, it is 
doubtful that the Court is looking to increase the role of the federal 
courts. Indeed, its decision in the same term in the case of Alexan-
der v. Sandoval, 22 in which it refused to recognize an implied cause 
of action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, clearly 
"signals" that the Court's distaste for implied causes of action 
continues. 
21 Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977)(plaintiff's claim, es-
sentially alleging a breach of fiduciary duty, could not be maintained as a se-
curities fraud claim). 
22121 S.Ct. 1511 (2001)(holding that there is no private right of action to 
enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of Civil 
Rights Act of 1964). 
